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Abstract
A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss
some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce
a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this
measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying
this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection
procedures are strategically simple.

1. Introduction
It is customary to let the parties involved in a jury trial dismiss some of the
potential jurors without justification. Procedures for dismissal are known as
peremptory-challenge procedures. Such procedures are used in many countries,
including the United States.1 A variety of procedures are used in practice. These
procedures differ notably in their strategic complexity. More complex procedures give an unfair advantage to parties who are strategically skilled or can devote ample resources to hiring jury consultants. It is therefore important to idenI am grateful to the editor and a referee for useful remarks and suggestions. I am also grateful to
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Wooders for helpful discussions and comments. I also thank the participants at presentations at
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Research and Econometrics and the Center for Research in Economics for their hospitality during
visits. Support from the Kirk Dornbush summer research grant and National Science Foundation
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1
In Swain v. Alabama (380 U.S. 202 [1965]), the Supreme Court affirmed that “[t]he right to
challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights
secured to the accused” (Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 [1894]). Following Batson v.
Kentucky (476 U.S. 79 [1986]), a party can disqualify a peremptory challenge by her opponent if she
can prove that the challenge was based on race. (Challenges based on gender were later also prohibited following J. E. B. v. Alabama [511 U.S. 127 (1994)].) However, Batson v. Kentucky is notoriously
hard to implement, and judges rarely rule in favor of Batson challenges (Marder 2012; Daly 2016).
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tify the procedures that are strategically simple in order to level the playing field
among parties. In this paper, I introduce the concept of a dominance threshold,
a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking, and I use this
measure to compare the complexity of some challenge procedures commonly
used in practice (see Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri [2013] for a survey of
the level-k literature).
Fairness is an important issue in jury selection. One feature of a procedure that
impacts fairness is its strategic complexity. If a procedure is complex, parties with
better strategic skills are likely to secure more favorable juries. This is particularly relevant in jury selection in which the parties invest significant resources for
developing an effective strategy. For example, jury selection consultancy has become a well-established industry.2 Using strategically simple procedures limits
the impact on the selected jury of differences in the parties’ ability to strategize or
in their financial means to hire jury consultants.
1.1. Comparing Strategic Complexity
Comparing the strategic complexity of jury selection procedures presents two
challenges. First, jury selection procedures are indirect mechanisms because the
parties’ actions consist of dismissing jurors rather than revealing their preferences. Second, in some procedures commonly used in practice, the parties submit
their challenges simultaneously, which induces games of imperfect information.
These two difficulties make it impossible to apply measures of strategic complexity previously developed in the literature (see Section 1.2).
I overcome these difficulties by introducing the concept of a dominance threshold. Given some assumption about the strategies her opponent could play—
henceforth, a model of her opponent—a party has a dominant strategy if one of
her strategies is a best response to any strategy of her opponent that is consistent
with her model. The objective is to identify models for which the parties have
dominant strategies. This is accomplished by iteratively eliminating strategies
that are never-best responses. The dominance threshold is the number of rounds
of elimination needed to reach models in which both parties have a dominant
strategy. The dominance threshold measures the complexity of the model of opponents that the parties need in order to have a dominant strategy. For example,
a dominance threshold of 1 corresponds to the parties having a dominant strategy given any model of their opponent. When the dominance threshold is 2, the
parties need to know only that their opponent is a best responder in order to have
a dominant strategy.
2
The widespread use of jury consultants is evidenced by the existence of the American Society of
Trial Consultants and its journal The Jury Expert: The Art and Science of Litigation Advocacy. Jury
consultants explicitly describe how part of their job is concerned with the strategic use of challenges.
Jury consultant Roy Futterman, for example, writes, “Caditz argues that . . . jury selectors pay . . .
little to no attention to the strategic use of strikes [that is, peremptory challenges]. . . . [I]t is a bit of
a reach to say that strategy is barely utilized. In my experience, . . . [jury selection] comes closer to
a long battle of stealth, counter-punches, misdirection, and hand-to-hand combat than a lofty academic experience” (Futterman 2014).
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Many judges appear to share the concern about selecting strategically simple
procedures and have developed procedures that attempt to limit the parties’ ability to strategize. In a report on judges’ practices regarding peremptory challenges,
Shapard and Johnson (1994, p. 6) write, “Some judges require that peremptories
be exercised [following procedure X]. . . . This approach . . . makes it more difficult to pursue a strategy prohibited by Batson (or any other strategy).” “A more
extreme approach to the same end . . . is [procedure Y]. . . . This approach imposes maximum limits on counsel’s ability to employ peremptories in a strategic
manner” (Shapard and Johnson [1994], p. 6 n. 6).
Using the dominance threshold as a measure of strategic complexity provides
new insights and challenges some commonly held beliefs about jury selection
procedures. Shapard and Johnson (1994, p. 6) write, “Other judges, for the same
purposes [that is, limiting the parties’ ability to strategize], allow all peremptories
to be exercised after all challenges for cause, but with the parties making their
choices ‘blind’ to the choices made by opposing parties (in contrast to alternating
‘strikes’ from a list of names of panel members).” I show that, contrary to these
judges’ beliefs, procedures in which challenges are sequential tend to be strategically simpler than procedures in which challenges are simultaneous: by generating imperfect-information games, simultaneous procedures increase the amount
of guesswork needed to determine optimal strategies.
I also study the design of maximally simple jury selection procedures. I show
that it is impossible to construct a reasonable procedure that allows the parties to
challenge jurors and always have a dominant strategy. Hence, the smallest achievable dominance threshold is 2. Such a minimal dominance threshold is attained
by a procedure that I call the sequential one-shot procedure, in which the parties
sequentially submit a single list of jurors whom they want to challenge.
1.2. Related Literature
This paper differs from the previous game-theoretic literature on jury selection
procedures in at least two ways (see Flanagan [2015] for a recent review). First,
the literature focuses on subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept (two
exceptions are Bermant [1982] and Caditz [2015]). Subgame perfection requires
a high level of strategic sophistication, especially in complex procedures. By relying on the concept of a dominance threshold, this paper accounts for the possibility of boundedly rational parties. I show how the dominance threshold, which
measures the amount of common knowledge and rationality needed to have a
dominant strategy, can be used to measure the strategic complexity of a procedure.
Second, most of the literature focuses on the characterization and properties of
equilibria of different procedures (see Roth, Kadane, and DeGroot 1977; Brams
and Davis 1978; DeGroot and Kadane 1980; Kadane, Stone, and Wallstrom 1999;
Alpern and Gal 2009; Alpern, Gal, and Solan 2010). When the performance of
procedures is compared, it is typically in terms of their effects on the composition

This content downloaded from 129.123.124.107 on June 24, 2019 12:19:40 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

714

The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS

of the jury. These comparisons have yielded few policy recommendations (see,
however, Bermant 1982; Flanagan 2015, sec. 4.2). In contrast, this paper compares procedures with respect to the standard objective of limiting the parties’
ability to strategize. This latter approach enables a clear comparison of some of
the procedures used in practice.
Focusing on strategic complexity also implies that this paper falls short of providing a full-fledged implementation analysis. Bounded rationality has been considered in implementation theory. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) notably show
that any social choice function can be (virtually) implemented in iteratively undominated strategies. Because the authors do not restrict the number of iterations, the mechanism they propose can, depending on the application, have a
very high dominance threshold.3 Instead of fixing a solution concept and investigating the social choice functions it allows to be implemented, this paper focuses on solution concepts themselves. I argue that among a particular class of
solution concepts, the weakest solution concept that enables solving a procedure
is a useful measure of a game’s strategic complexity. A natural subsequent question—which is left open—is to determine the best procedure (according to some
outcome-oriented objective) that can be solved by a reasonably weak solution
concept (as in de Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight 2014).4
This paper also focuses heavily on procedures that are relevant in practice for
jury selection. As a consequence, my analysis incorporates a number of institutional constraints that are specific to jury selection. In particular, I consider only
procedures in which the parties’ actions are limited to challenging some prospective jurors. Selection procedures based on other action spaces (for example, direct mechanisms) are known to have interesting properties (Barberà and Coelho
2008).5 For restricted domains, some of those procedures even have dominant
strategies (Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou 1991; Barberà, Massó, and Neme
2005) or can be solved by finitely rational players (Abreu and Matsushima 1992;
de Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight 2014). However, those procedures involve—sometimes complex—action spaces that go beyond the simple challenge of jurors. My
focus on challenge procedures is motivated by the fact that, in the context of jury
selection, the law and legal customs often specifically limit the parties’ actions to
challenges. One contribution of this paper is to show that the few selection procedures with dominant strategies identified by Barberà, Massó, and Neme (2005)
do not survive conferring the parties with minimal challenge abilities (see also
Van der Linden 2017).
The dominance threshold relates to a recent strand of the literature that com3
Another difference is that Abreu and Matsushima (1992) rely on iteratively undominated strategies, whereas most of this paper deals with iteratively never-best responses. See Section 8 for a discussion of how my results generalize to iterated undominated strategies.
4
In this respect, it would be useful to develop a parametrized outcome-oriented objective for jury
selection procedures. One could then weigh trade-offs between the degree to which a procedure satisfies the objective and the procedure’s level of strategic complexity.
5
For a general characterization of mechanisms with a dominance threshold of 2, see Börgers and
Li (2017).
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pares the incentive properties of mechanisms that fail to have dominant strategies.6 For example, Pathak and Sönmez (2013) and Arribillaga and Massó (2016)
define comparison criteria for direct games. In indirect games, de Clippel, Eliaz,
and Knight (2014) recommend focusing on procedures that can be solved in two
rounds of backward induction. More generally, this last recommendation suggests using the number of rounds of backward induction needed to solve a procedure as a measure of its complexity.
Measures developed for direct mechanisms are not well suited for the comparison of jury selection procedures because those procedures induce indirect games.
In addition, an important question in the choice of a jury selection procedure
is whether challenges should be simultaneous or sequential. Because backward
induction is defined only for perfect-information games, a different measure is
therefore required. (When games are modeled in extensive form, any simultaneous move implies that the game is of imperfect information.)7 Unlike previous
measures in the literature, the dominance threshold can be used to compare the
strategic complexity of any pair of games, including indirect games and games of
imperfect information. Although the focus of this paper is the study of jury selection procedures, the dominance threshold applies more generally as a general
measure of strategic complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, several examples of jury selection procedures, and a general class of procedures. In Section
3, I show that most reasonable jury selection procedures do not have dominant
strategies. Section 4 formally introduces the concept of a dominance threshold.
The dominance threshold is then applied to comparing the strategic complexity
of jury selection procedures in Sections 5 and 6. Whereas the previous sections
considered a complete-information setting, Section 7 considers an extension to
situations of incomplete information. In Section 8, I consider further extensions
and discuss some open questions. Proofs are in the Online Appendix.
2. Model and Procedures
I focus on struck procedures. In addition to peremptory challenges, which require no justification, the parties can raise challenges for cause, which must be
6
In contrast, Li (2015) proposes a criterion to compare the incentive properties of different mechanisms that all have dominant strategies.
7
Even under complete information, one must be careful to prune game trees before using the
number of rounds of backward induction as a measure of strategic complexity. For example, consider the divide-and-choose procedure for the fair division of a divisible endowment. The procedure
has a dominance threshold of 2 and can be solved in two rounds of backward induction. In contrast,
consider the divide-and-choose-and-raise-your-hand procedure. In this alternate procedure, after
the endowment has been shared, players sequentially raise or lower their hands, with the show of
hands having no impact on the final allocation. Unlike the divide-and-choose procedure, the divide-and-choose-and-raise-your-hand procedure requires four rounds of backward induction to
be solved because of the addition of the inconsequential raise-your-hand action. The latter actions
should therefore be pruned before applying the measure of backward-induction complexity. In contrast, the dominance threshold is insensitive to the addition of the inconsequential action and does
not require pruning the game tree.
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based on some bias recognized by law, such as being a direct relative of one of the
parties. As explained by Bermant and Shapard (1981, p. 92), the defining feature
of a struck procedure “is that the judge rules on all challenges for cause before the
parties claim any peremptories. Enough potential jurors are examined to allow
for the size of the jury plus the number of peremptory challenges allotted to both
sides. In a federal felony trial, for example, the jury size is twelve; the prosecution has six peremptories, and the defense has ten. Under the struck jury method,
therefore, 28 potential jurors are cleared through challenges for cause before the
exercise of peremptories.”8
Struck procedures are commonly used in federal courts. In a 1977 survey of
judges’ practices regarding the exercise of peremptory challenges, 55 percent of
federal district judges reported using a struck procedure (Bermant and Shapard
1981). Today, the use of a struck procedure is, for example, recommended by
law as the preferred method for criminal cases other than first-degree murder in
Minnesota (Minn.R. Crim. P. 26.02, subdiv. 4.[3]b).
2.1. The Model
The set of prospective jurors left after all challenges for cause have been raised
is N = {1, . . . , n}. The defendant D and the plaintiff P are allowed cD and cP peremptory challenges, respectively. From N, a jury J of b jurors must be selected.
The jurors in J are the impaneled jurors. As explained above, when struck procedures are considered, n = b + cD + cP to allow the parties to challenge up to cD
and cP jurors.
Let  be the set of juries containing b jurors, and let D be the set of lotteries
on �
. In some cases, it is possible that after all challenges have been raised, more
than b jurors remain unchallenged. In this case, I assume that the b impaneled jurors are chosen at random among the unchallenged jurors. As a consequence, the
parties have expected utility preferences RD and RP on D with corresponding
Bernoulli utility functions uD and uP on  . A pair of preferences (RP, RD) is called
a preference profile (hereafter, profile), and a quintuple (RP, RD, cP, cD, b) is called
a jury selection problem (hereafter, problem).
Throughout, I assume for simplicity that preferences on juries are separable;
that is, if replacing juror h by juror j in jury J is an improvement according to ui,
then the same is true when h is replaced by j in any other jury J¢. Formally, for any
i ∈ {D, P}, any J, J ¢ Î  , any h ∈ J ∩ J¢, and any j ∈ N \ (J ∪ J¢), we have ui(J ∪ {j}
\ {h}) ≥ ui(J) if and only if ui(J¢ ∪ {j} \ {h}) ≥ ui(J¢).
When describing their approach to jury selection, jury consultants often suggest the use of separable (and even additive) preferences relying on some rating
or scoring of the individual jurors (Caditz 2014; Leibold 2015). However, other
8
This contrasts with strike-and-replace procedures, in which challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are intertwined. In a strike-and-replace procedure, prospective jurors who are challenged (either for cause or peremptorily) are replaced by new jurors from the pool and “to one degree or another, counsel exercise their challenges without knowing the characteristics of the next
potential juror to be interviewed” (Bermant and Shapard 1981, p. 93).
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consultants point to the importance of interactions between jurors that cannot be
captured by separable preferences (see, for example, Futterman 2014).
Importantly, most of the results in this paper still hold when separability is not
assumed. Separability is mainly used to facilitate the formulation of a condition
on profiles, which, if satisfied, make simultaneous procedures infinitely complex.
I discuss the role of separability in more detail after the statements of propositions 4, 5, and 6.
Separability eases the exposition because it implies that the preferences RD and
RP induce well-defined preferences for individual jurors. It is also assumed that
the preferences for jurors induced by RD and RP are strict. With a slight abuse of
notation, Ri serves to denote i’s preferences for individual jurors and for juries.
An extreme kind of profile is a juror-inverse profile. A profile is juror inverse
if RD and RP induce inverse preferences in jurors (that is, for all j, h ∈ N, j RP h if
and only if h RD j). Unlike separability, which is assumed throughout the paper,
juror-inverse profiles are considered only as a special case.
2.2. Procedures
As attested to by Bermant and Shapard (1981), a wide variety of struck procedures are used by judges. One common type of struck procedures are those I call
one-shot procedures. In a one-shot procedure, each party i ∈ {D, P} submits a
single list of up to ci jurors in N that i wants to challenge. Depending on the procedure, the parties submit their lists simultaneously (the one-shotM procedure)
or sequentially (the one-shotQ procedure). The impaneled jurors are the jurors in
N who have not been challenged. If more than b jurors are left unchallenged, the
b impaneled jurors are drawn at random from among the unchallenged jurors.9
Another common type of struck procedure are the procedures that I call alternating. Alternating procedures proceed through a succession of rounds in which
the parties can challenge as many jurors in N as they have challenges left. Again,
an alternating procedure can be either simultaneous (alternatingM) or sequential
(alternatingQ) depending on whether challenges are submitted simultaneously or
sequentially in each round. In the alternatingM procedure, if both parties challenge the same juror in a given round, both parties are charged with the challenge
and can challenge one less juror.
Alternating procedures end when neither party has challenges left or when
both parties abstain from challenging jurors in a single round. The impaneled jurors are the jurors left unchallenged in N or a random draw of b of these jurors if
more than b jurors are left unchallenged.10
9
The use of the one-shotM procedure is documented by Bermant (1982, pp. 17–18, comments of
Judges John Feikens and Donald S. Voorhees). Bermant (1982, p. 17, comments of Judge William
B. Enright) shows that a procedure in which the parties alternate challenges twice has been used in
practice, with each party allowed to challenge up to ci/2 jurors in each round. Other than the fact
that multiple jurors are selected (instead of a single arbitrator), the one-shotQ procedure is strategically equivalent to the shortlisting procedure proposed by de Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight (2014).
10
Simultaneous challenges are used in alternating procedures for civil cases in Tennessee (Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 47.03), although the mandated procedure in these cases is of the strike-and-replace type
(see note 8).
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One-shot and alternating procedures are members of the class of N-struck
procedures in which parties take turns challenging jurors from N for a number of rounds.11 Formally, every N-struck procedure consists of a maximum of
f ≥ 1 rounds, where f differs between procedures. Each round r ∈ {1, . . . , f } is
characterized by a maximum number of challenges xir ³ 1 for each party, with
å rf=1 ³ ci . The number of challenges party i has left in round r is  ri , with 1i = ci .
In each round r, (A) the parties can challenge up to min{xir ,  ri } jurors among
the jurors in N who have not yet been challenged. Challenges are sequential if
the procedure is sequential and simultaneous if the procedure is simultaneous.
(B) For each party i ∈ {D, P}, the number of challenges left is decreased by the
number of jurors that the party challenged in A (that is,  ri +1 equals  ri minus the
number of jurors that the party challenged in A).
The procedure terminates when no party has challenges left, when round f is
reached, or when both parties abstain from challenging jurors in a single round.
The jurors left unchallenged when the procedure terminates are the impaneled
jurors. If more than b jurors are left unchallenged when the procedure terminates, the b impaneled jurors are drawn at random from the unchallenged jurors.12
One-shot procedures are N-struck procedures with f = 1 and xi1 = ci for both
parties i ∈ {D, P}. Alternating procedures are N-struck procedures with xir = ci
for both i ∈ {D, P} and all r ∈ {1, . . . , f }, and f = 2maxi∈{D, P}ci. Besides one-shot and
alternating procedures, the class of N-struck procedures includes, for example,
the two-round procedure documented by Bermant (1982, p. 17, comments of
Judge Enright) and described in note 2.
From a game-theoretic point of view, a (jury selection) procedure is an extensive game form G : D ´ P ® D that associates any pair of strategies (sD, sP) in
some strategy space D ´ P with a lottery on juries in �
. In this paper, I restrict
attention to pure strategies in any extensive game form Γ, although the results
also hold when mixed strategies are allowed.
3. Impossibility Results
Given preference Ri, a best response for party i to some strategy s−i of her opponent is a strategy ti(s−i) such that
G[t i (s-i ), s-i ] Ri G(si¢, s-i )

for all si¢ Î i .

(1)

When −i plays s−i and i plays ti(s−i), party i plays a best response to −i. A strategy si Î i is dominant for i given some model S-i Í -i of her opponent if si
is a best response to every strategy s-i Î S-i . A dominant strategy is a strategy
si* Î i that is a best response for i to any strategy s-i Î -i . In other words, a
11
The term “N-struck procedure” emphasizes the fact that, in each round, the parties can challenge any juror in N who has not been challenged yet. This is not the case in every struck procedure
(Bermant 1982, pp. 16–17, comments of Judge C. Clyde Atkins).
12
The distribution is arbitrary as long as any remaining juror has a strictly positive probability of
being selected.
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dominant strategy is a strategy that is dominant for i given any model of her opponent.
Given some domain of preferences, a dominant-strategy procedure is a procedure in which both parties have a dominant strategy for every profile in the
domain. Dominant-strategy procedures are strategically simple because each
party can determine an optimal strategy regardless of her guess about the strategy of her opponent. Dominant-strategy procedures guarantee a form of equality
among equals: two parties having the same preferences but different abilities to
form expectations about their opponent’s strategy should be able to secure similar outcomes.
It is useful to relate dominant strategies with level-k thinking (see the survey
in Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri [2013]). In level-k terminology, an L0i
party is a nonstrategic party who could potentially play any strategy. An L1i party
assumes that her opponent is L0-i , makes a guess about the L0-i strategy s-0 i that
her opponent will employ, and plays a best response to s-0 i .13 Similarly, an Lki party
assumes that her opponent is Lk--i 1 , makes a guess about the Lk--i 1 strategy s-k-i 1
that her opponent will employ, and plays a best response to s-k-i 1 .
Observe that, because an L0-i strategy can be any of −i’s strategies, i has a dominant strategy if and only if i has an L1i strategy that is a best response to every L0-i
strategy of her opponent. In the language of level-k thinking, a dominant-strategy
procedure limits the impact of differences in strategic skills because i can determine an optimal strategy regardless of her belief about her opponent’s level of
rationality k−i or her guess about which Lk--ii strategy her opponent will employ.
Unfortunately, most reasonable procedures that permit challenges do not have
a dominant strategy. Consider the one-shotM procedure. In the one-shotM procedure, i’s only best response to any s−i is to challenge her ci worst jurors among the
jurors whom −i does not challenge in s−i. As illustrated in example 1, such a best
response is highly dependent on the challenges chosen by −i. Hence, the oneshotM procedure is not a dominant-strategy procedure.
Example 1. Suppose that each juror has four challenges (cD = cP = 4) and one
juror must be selected (b = 1). A set of nine prospective jurors N = {1, . . . , 9} will
therefore remain after all challenges for cause have been raised. Let D’s preference for these nine jurors be 1 RD 2 RD . . . RD 9. If P challenges the circled jurors
in preference (P1), then D’s best response is to challenge the boxed jurors:

If P instead challenges the circled jurors in preference (P2), D’s best response is
again to challenge the boxed jurors:

13
Recall that I consider only pure strategies. Hence, the set of i’s level-0 strategies is the set of i’s
pure strategies. Again, all the results in this paper hold when mixed strategies are allowed. In particular, the results hold when i’s level-1 strategies include i’s best responses to probabilistic beliefs
about the (pure) level-0 strategy that −i will employ, as in Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998).
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Clearly, challenging the boxed jurors in preference (P2) is not a best response for
D to P’s challenging the circled jurors in preference (P1), which shows that the
one-shotM procedure is not a dominant-strategy procedure in any domain that
has a profile containing RD.
As shown in proposition 1, the preceding example generalizes to the whole
class of N-struck procedures and to any problem. Intuitively, in any N-struck
procedure, if −i does not challenge any jurors, then i’s best response is to challenge her ci worst jurors. On the other hand, if −i challenges one of the ci worst
jurors of i, say w, then i is better off not challenging w and challenging one of her
other ci worst jurors. Recall that a (jury selection) problem is a quintuple (RD, RP,
cD, cP, b).
Proposition 1. For any problem, (i) the first party does not have a dominant
strategy in the one-shotQ procedure, and (ii) neither party has a dominant strategy in any N-struck procedure different from the one-shotQ procedure.
Note that the one-shotM procedure is an N-struck procedure different from the
one-shotQ procedure. Hence, proposition 1 shows that, for every problem, neither party has a dominant strategy in the one-shotM procedure. The one-shotQ
procedure is the exception among N-struck procedures: it is the only N-struck
procedure in which one of the parties—the second party to challenge—has a
dominant strategy, although the other party does not for the reason explained
before proposition 1. (See the proof of proposition 1 in the Online Appendix for
more detail.)
Of course, N-struck procedures are only a small subset of all possible jury selection procedures. Other procedures used in practice include strike-and-replace
procedures (see note 8) and other struck procedures in which the parties can
challenge only from subsets of N in each round (Bermant 1982, pp. 16–17, comments of Judge Atkins). To my knowledge, the law recognizes only the challenge
of jurors as an appropriate way for the parties to influence the composition of the
jury, and procedures based on such challenges are the only ones used in practice.
However, one could think of using other types of procedures, such as the classical
selection procedures mentioned in Section 1 and involving the direct revelation
of preferences (see, for example, Barberà, Massó, and Neme 2005). Other indirect procedures could also be considered, such as procedures in which the parties
nominate jurors rather than challenge them, maybe with the option for a party to
refuse some of the other party’s nominations. Flanagan (2015) argues that procedures in which the parties are allowed to challenge entire juries (rather than individual jurors) may have desirable properties.14
In view of this variety of non-N-struck procedures, it is natural to ask whether
14
For example, the parties can be repeatedly presented with potential juries of b jurors drawn
from N. In each round, a new potential jury is drawn, and the parties are given the ability to reject
the proposed jury a number of times. The jury proposed in a given round then becomes the effective
jury if neither party challenges it in that round (either because the parties have no challenges left or
because they abstain from using them).
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there exist dominant-strategy procedures for jury selection outside the N-struck
class. Proposition 2 shows that if such procedures exist, then they must either deprive a party of her right to challenge at least one juror in N or be so intricate that
they are unlikely to be used in practice.
A procedure satisfies finiteness if the set of its decision nodes is finite for both
parties and for nature. A procedure satisfies minimal challenge if for every prospective juror j ∈ N, both parties i ∈ {D, P} have a strategy sij Î i such that j is
never part of the chosen jury when i plays sij .15 Every N-struck procedure satisfies both finiteness and minimal challenge (strategy sij can, for example, involve
challenging juror j—and only juror j—in the first round).16
Proposition 2. In the domain of separable preferences, no dominant-strategy
procedure satisfies both finiteness and minimal challenge.
In the Online Appendix, I show that proposition 2 is, in fact, true for smaller domains of profiles, including the domain of additive profiles.
4. A Measure of Strategic Complexity
Propositions 1 and 2 show that most procedures are not strategically simple
in the sense that both parties cannot always follow the simple recommendation
of playing a dominant strategy. This does not mean, however, that judges should
give up on the idea of using procedures that are as simple as possible. This section
and Section 5 show that, although procedures generally fail to feature dominant
strategies, not all procedures are equal in terms of strategic complexity.
4.1. Motivating Example
Brams and Davis (1978, p. 969) argue that, when the parties have juror-inverse
preferences, one-shot procedures raise “no strategic questions of timing: given
that each side can determine those veniremen [that is, potential jurors] it believes
least favorably disposed to its cause, it should challenge these up to the limit of
its peremptory challenges.” This quote may be interpreted in different ways, but
it suggests that challenging one’s least-preferred jurors is a clear optimal strategy in this case. This may come as a surprise given example 1 and proposition 1.
Certainly the one-shotM procedure is not a dominant-strategy procedure. In particular, challenging one’s least-preferred jurors is not a dominant strategy. How
can one then make sense of Brams and Davis’s claim? Example 2 suggests one
possible answer.
Example 2. Consider the one-shotM procedure with cD = cP = 2 and b = 5.
Let D have preference 1 RD . . . RD 9. Also suppose that the parties have juror-
That is, the probability that j is chosen given that i plays sij is 0 for all s−i.
The last two procedures outlined above also satisfy both properties, at least if the parties are
allowed to oppose nominations in the first one. Procedures proposed in Barberà, Massó, and Neme
(2005), however, do not satisfy minimal challenge; see Van der Linden (2017).
15

16
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inverse preferences. If D believes that P is playing a best response to one of her
strategies, D knows that P will challenge two of the circled jurors in profile (P3):

Indeed, a best response by P always involves challenging her two worst jurors
among the seven jurors that she believes D will not challenge. Therefore, regardless of the jurors whom P believes D will challenge, a best response by P can never
include P challenging a juror in {5, . . . , 9}. Thus, a best response by D to the minimal belief that P is a best responder always consists in challenging her two worst
jurors (boxed in profile [P3]). By symmetry, the same is true for P.
In example 2, the one-shotM procedure raises no strategic question because a
party needs to know only that her opponent is a best responder in order to have
a dominant strategy. For each party i, challenging her ci worst jurors is a best response to any strategy of party −i that is itself a best response to one of i’s strategies. In this sense, each party i has a dominant strategy given a minimal model of
the strategic behavior of her opponent: the model S-i = L1-i .
In the rest of this section, I generalize this logic to obtain a measure of strategic
complexity. I then apply this measure in Sections 5 and 6 to compare struck procedures for different assumptions on the problem (RD, RP, cD, cP, b).
4.2. The Dominance Threshold
As argued above, first-best procedures are procedures in which each party has
a dominant strategy no matter what model she has of her opponent. It is then
natural to call a procedure second best if each party has a dominant strategy
given a minimal model of her opponent. As suggested in example 2, a meaningful
concept of a minimal model is for a party to assume that her opponent will play a
best response to some of her strategies.
In the language of level-k thinking, a procedure is second best if each party i
has an L2i strategy that is a best response to every L1-i strategy of her opponent.
Such second-best procedures limit the impact of differences in strategic skills because i’s optimal strategy depends minimally on her model of −i: i needs to assume only that −i is L1-i to have a dominant strategy.
The difference between first-best and second-best procedures is demonstrated
in Figure 1, where an arrow from strategy si to strategy s−i means that si is a best
response to s−i. In the first-best procedure represented in Figure 1A, party i has a
strategy— si6 —that is a best response to every strategy of her opponent (that is, to
every L0-i strategy). In the second-best procedure in Figure 1B, party i has a strategy— si4 —that is a best response to every strategy of her opponent that is itself a
best response (that is, to every L1-i strategy). However, si4 does not need to be a
best response to every L0-i strategy. For example, in Figure 1B, si4 is not a best
response to s-1 i .
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Figure 1. First- (A), second- (B), and third-best (C) procedures

A second-best procedure guarantees a form of second-best equality among
equal parties. Consider two defendants with the same preferences who both believe that P is L1P and play a best response to one of her strategies. The two defendants might differ in other strategic aspects, such as their ability to guess which of
their strategies P plays a best response to. In a second-best procedure, these differences have no impact: the two defendants play equivalent strategies and secure
the same outcome.
Similarly, third-best procedures feature dominant strategies given a model that
is minimally stronger than in second-best procedures. A natural candidate for
such a minimally stronger model is for i to assume that −i is L2-i (see Figure 1C).
This logic extends to higher-level reasoning.
In procedures with multiple rounds, it is important to ensure that best responses be enforced throughout the game tree. Therefore, the measure of strategic complexity defined below relies on the iterated elimination of strategies that
are never-best responses in any subgame of an extensive game. That is, in each
round of elimination, any strategy that fails to be a best response when restricted
to any subgame of the game is discarded.
Definition 1: Iterated Elimination of Never-Best Responses. For any procedure Γ and any profile (RD, RP), the process of iterated elimination of never-best
responses is defined as follows:
Step 0. For each i ∈ {D, P}, the set of L0i (level-0) strategies is i .
Step 1. For each i ∈ {D, P}, eliminate from L0i the strategies si for which there
exist a subgame γ of Γ such that the restriction si|γ of si to γ is not a best response
to any s−i|γ in γ.
The remaining set of strategies is denoted L1i . Any si Î L1i is called an L1i
(level-1) strategy for i.

Step k. For each i ∈ {D, P}, eliminate from Lki-1 the strategies si for which
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there exist a subgame γ of Γ such that the restriction si|γ of si to γ is not a best response to s−i|γ for any s-i Î Lk--i 1 .
The remaining set of strategies is denoted Lki . Any si Î Lki is called an Lki
(level-k) strategy for i.
Observe that the sets of level-k strategies are nested (L0i Ê L1i Ê ). Observe
also that, for every procedure Γ that satisfies finiteness, the set of level-k strategies
is nonempty for every k.17 The argument at the beginning of this section suggests
using the following concept of a dominance threshold as a measure of strategic
complexity.
Definition 2: Dominance Threshold. For any procedure Γ and any profile
(RD, RP), the dominance threshold is the smallest integer r* such that, for each i ∈
{D, P}, there exists an Lri * strategy si* that is a best response to every Lr-*i-1 strategy.
If there exists no such integer, then the dominance threshold of Γ is ∞; that is,
the procedure cannot be solved by iterated elimination of never-best responses.
Note that if the dominance threshold r* is finite, then there exists a strategy profile (si , s-i ) Î Lri * ´ Lr-*i that is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Throughout this paper, the parties’ knowledge of each other’s preferences and
levels of rationality is left unspecified. The idea behind the dominance threshold
is precisely to measure the amount of common knowledge needed for the parties
to have dominant strategies. For example, when the dominance threshold of a
game is 1, each party has a dominant strategy regardless of her knowledge of her
opponent’s preferences and level of rationality (the parties need to know only the
structure of the game). When the dominance threshold is 2, each party needs to
know only her opponent’s preferences and the fact that her opponent is a best responder in order to have a dominant strategy.
The related concept of a rationality threshold was introduced by Ho, Camerer,
and Weigelt (1998). For a given assumption about the strategies of unsophisticated players, the rationality threshold measures the number of rounds of iterated best responses needed to reach an equilibrium. In contrast, the dominance
threshold relies on iterated elimination of never-best responses and does not require a specific assumption about the nature of unsophisticated plays.
The dominance threshold also relates to rationalizability. For a dominance
threshold r*, any strategy in Lri * is rationalizable. The set of i’s rationalizable
strategies can be larger than Lri * if some rationalizable strategies are not best responses to all the strategies of −i that survive the iterated elimination of never-
best responses. In addition, the rationality threshold is finite if for every player
i, the set of i’s rationalizable strategies contains a strategy that is a best response
to all the strategies of −i that survive the iterated elimination of never-best responses. The rationality threshold is infinite otherwise.
17
When Γ satisfies finiteness, for any i ∈ {D, P} and any strategy s−i, the set {G(si , s-i ) | si Î i } is
finite because i is finite. Hence, there must exist a strategy ti(s−i) such that G[t i (s-i ), s-i ]Ri G(si¢, s-i )
for all si¢ Î i and L1i is nonempty. The nonemptiness of Lki then follows by induction.
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5. One-Shot Procedures
In this section, I show that the one-shotQ procedure is strategically simpler
than the one-shotM procedure in the following sense:
Proposition 3. (i) For every problem, the dominance threshold of the oneshotM procedure is no smaller than the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ
procedure. (ii) For some problems, the dominance threshold of the one-shotM
procedure is larger than the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ procedure.
In the rest of this section, I prove and illustrate proposition 3.
5.1. The One-ShotQ Procedure Is Always Maximally Simple
Example 3 illustrates how to compute the dominance threshold of the oneshotQ procedure for a particular problem:
Example 3. This example is represented in Figure 2, where LT for T ⊆ N represents a lottery in which one juror is drawn at random from T. The labels on the
branches of the tree indicate the juror who is challenged in the corresponding
action. Suppose that cD = cP = b = 1 and D is the first party to challenge. Suppose
also that the parties have aligned preferences 1 RD 2 RD 3 and 1 RP 2 RP 3. Because
preferences for jurors are strict, P has a unique dominant strategy sP*, which consists of challenging juror 3 if D did not challenge juror 3 and challenging juror 2
if D did challenge juror 3 (dotted branches). Strategy sP* is, therefore, the unique
L1P strategy. It directly follows from uniqueness that sP* is a best response to all L1D
strategies. Because there is a unique L1P strategy sP*, any L2D strategy that best responds to sP* (either dashed branch in Figure 2) is a best response to all L1P strategies. Hence, the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ procedure is at most 2
for this problem. But by proposition 1, because the one-shotM procedure is an
N-struck procedure, the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ procedure is at
least 2 for every problem. Thus, the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ procedure is 2 for this problem.
It is not hard to see how the argument in example 3 generalizes to any problem. In general, the party −i who challenges second in the one-shotQ procedure
has a unique dominant strategy s-*i . Then any best response by i to s-*i is a best
response to every L1-i strategy.
Proposition 4.
procedure is 2.

For any problem, the dominance threshold of the one-shotQ

Proposition 4 does not depend on the separability assumption. Instead, the
proof relies on the fact that preferences for the outcomes of the procedure are
strict. Proposition 4 also extends to situations in which complete information
(which is implicit in the definition of a dominance threshold of 2) is relaxed.
Consider example 3. To have a dominant strategy, D needs to know only that
P will challenge juror 3 if she challenges juror 2. Hence, D needs to know only
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Figure 2. Computing the dominance threshold in example 3

which juror is P’s worst juror in order to have a dominant strategy (as opposed to
knowing all of P’s preferences for jurors; see example 6). See Section 7 for a more
detailed discussion of incomplete information.
By proposition 1, because the one-shotM procedure is an N-struck procedure,
the dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is at least 2 for every problem. Together with proposition 4, this implies that the dominance threshold of
the one-shotM procedure is never smaller than the dominance threshold of the
one-shotQ procedure, which proves proposition 3.i.
5.2. The One-ShotM Procedure Is Often Complex: One-Common Profiles
I now show that the one-shotM procedure is more complex than the one-shotQ
procedure. This is true when the profile is not juror inverse and preferences for
jurors satisfy some commonality at the bottom.
5.2.1. Motivating Example
Example 4, Part 1. This example is represented in Table 1. Suppose that b
= cD = cP = 1. Also suppose that the parties’ preferences are 1 RD 2 RD 3 and
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2 RP 1 RP 3. Both challenging juror 3 and challenging juror 1 are L0P strategies.18
Challenging juror 2 is D’s best response to P challenging juror 3, and challenging
juror 3 is D’s best response to P challenging juror 1. Hence, both challenging juror 2 and challenging juror 3 are L1D strategies. But no strategy of P is a best response to both of these L1D strategies. Therefore, the dominance threshold of the
one-shotM procedure is at least 3 for this problem.
In example 4, both parties agree that juror 3 is the worst juror. Therefore, any
party playing a best response would challenge juror 3 if her opponent did not.
But each party also prefers a situation in which her opponent challenges juror 3
and she challenges her second-worst juror. That is, each party would like to make
a credible threat not to challenge juror 3 and free ride on her opponent’s challenge of juror 3. But because the procedure is simultaneous, such a credible threat
is impossible. As explained in detail in example 4, the impossibility for the parties
to commit to leaving juror 3 unchallenged makes the dominance threshold of the
one-shotM procedure larger than 2 for this problem. Together with proposition
4, example 4 therefore proves proposition 3.ii. In fact, the dominance threshold
in example 4 is ∞, which shows just how complex the one-shotM procedure can
become when the profile is not juror inverse.
Example 4, Part 2. Party P’s best responses to these two L1D strategies are to
challenge juror 3 (P’s best response to D challenging juror 2) and to challenge juror 1 (P’s best response to D challenging juror 3); see Table 1. Thus, challenging
juror 3 and challenging juror 1 are both L2P strategies. But these two L2P strategies are the two L0P strategies considered at the beginning of example 4. The argument therefore extends by induction, which shows that the dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is ∞ for this problem.
As example 4 illustrates, for some profiles that are not juror inverse, the parties’
common knowledge of each other’s rationality and preferences is not sufficient
to provide the parties with dominant strategies and make the game strategically
simple. Even for high levels of common knowledge, the game induced by the
one-shotM procedure remains akin to a game of chicken in which each party prefers to swerve (that is, challenge some of her worst jurors) if her opponent stays
straight (that is, does not challenge some of her worst jurors) but prefers to stay
straight if her opponent swerves.
5.2.2. One-Common Profiles
Profiles for which the dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is ∞
are not rare. Given cD and cP, a profile is a one-common profile if a juror w who is
among the cD worst jurors of D is also among the cP worst jurors of P. Intuitively,
the dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is ∞ for one-common
profiles because the free-rider problem described in example 4 extends to one-
18
Challenging juror 2 and not challenging a juror are also L0P strategies. However, it is sufficient
to consider the other two L0P strategies.
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Table 1
Iterated Best Responses for Juror Challenges in Example 4

Strategy 1
Strategy 2

L0P
Strategies

L1D
Strategies

L2P
Strategies

L3D
Strategies

...

3
1

2
3

3
1

2
3

...
...

common profiles. When the profile is a one-common profile, each party would
like to make a credible threat not to challenge juror w and free ride on her opponent’s challenge of juror w. But if her opponent does not challenge w, each party
prefers to challenge w herself than to leave w unchallenged.
Proposition 5. If the profile is a one-common profile, then the dominance
threshold of the one-shotM procedure is ∞.
Although proposition 5 relies more directly than proposition 4 on the separability assumption,19 the intuition behind proposition 5 applies even when separability is relaxed. Regardless of the assumptions about preferences, if for some
juror w both parties have best responses that include challenging w, then the
dominance threshold is larger than 2 in the one-shotM procedure. Proposition 5
also extends to situations of incomplete information in which the parties know
only that they have a common juror w at the bottom of their ranking of jurors
(but do not know each other’s complete preferences for jurors).
One-common profiles arise in a number of natural jury selection situations.
For example, both parties may dislike a juror whom they view as too unpredictable. Both parties may also dislike devil’s advocates or irresolute jurors who are
likely to induce a hung jury and to force a retrial of the case. Finally, D may dislike juror j’s position on some charges, while P may dislike juror j’s position on
different charges.
Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson (2014) provide suggestive evidence of overlapping preferences in jury selection.20 In the Online Appendix, I show that
one-common profiles are frequent in a different, yet similar, problem: the selection of an arbitrator between unions and employers by the New Jersey Public
Employment Relations Commission from 1985 to 1996 (Bloom and Cavanagh
1986; de Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight 2014). I also show that one-common profiles
represent a significant proportion of the set of profiles. This is true even when attention is limited to profiles that are close to being juror inverse (in a sense that is
made precise in the Online Appendix).
In the Online Appendix, the proportion of one-common profiles is shown to
be an increasing function of the number of challenges and a decreasing function
of the number of jurors b. In accordance with the objective of reducing strategic complexity, proposition 5 and the results in the Online Appendix therefore
One-common profiles are not well defined without the separability assumption.
In 700 felony cases in Florida, Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson (2014) find that both defendants
and plaintiffs are less likely to challenge black jurors. They suggest that this may be due to the parties’ shared aversion to being accused of violating Batson v. Kentucky.
19
20
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provide a game-theoretic justification for decreasing the number of peremptory
challenges, a measure that has some support among those who defend a reform
of the peremptory challenge system (Henley 1996). Procedures in which the
number of challenges is high relative to b exist in practice. In the United States,
the number of challenges tends to increase with the gravity of the charges. For example, in federal cases for which the death penalty is sought by the prosecution, b
= 12 and cD = cP = 20. In this case, the dominance threshold is ∞ for more than
97 percent of the profiles (and more than 15 percent of the profiles that are close
to being juror inverse).
Overall, the results in this section contrast with judges’ beliefs that blind (that
is, simultaneous) procedures leave less room for the parties to strategize than sequential ones (see Shapard and Johnson 1994, p. 6). Contrary to judges’ beliefs,
the dominance thresholds suggest that the one-shotQ procedure is strategically
simpler than the one-shotM procedure: by making past actions observable, the
one-shotQ procedure allows the parties to make credible threats about the jurors
they challenge, which reduces the amount of guesswork involved in determining an appropriate strategy. Section 6 shows that similar results hold for other
N-struck procedures.
6. Alternating and Other N-Struck Procedures
In general, it is unclear how the alternatingM and alternatingQ procedures compare. However, extending the logic of proposition 5, I show that it is possible to
obtain a partial comparison for a significant subset of profiles. For this subset of
profiles, the dominance threshold of any simultaneous N-struck procedure (including alternatingM) is infinite, whereas the dominance threshold of any sequential N-struck procedure (including alternatingQ) is finite.
If preferences for the outcomes of a sequential N-struck procedure are strict
(including preferences regarding lotteries), then the procedure always has a finite
dominance threshold. This follows from the fact that, with strict preferences on
the set of outcomes, sequential N-struck procedures induce games of perfect information that can be uniquely solved by backward induction.21 Then the number
of rounds of backward induction required to solve the game is an upper bound
for the dominance threshold.
Proposition 6. For any sequential N-struck procedures, if preferences for the
outcomes of the procedure are strict, then the dominance threshold is finite and
smaller than the depth of the game tree.22
Again, proposition 6 does not depend on the separability assumption but instead on the assumption that preferences for the outcomes of the procedure are
strict.
Recall that the one-shotM procedure has an infinite dominance threshold when
21
More precisely, multiple strategy profiles can survive backward induction, but each of them
must yield the same outcome.
22
The depth of a game tree is the length of the longest path from the initial node to a terminal
node.
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the profile is a one-common profile because each party would like to free ride on
her opponent’s challenge of one of the jurors they both dislike (see example 5).
This idea generalizes to the class of simultaneous N-struck procedures as a whole.
Below I identify for each simultaneous N-struck procedure Γ a set of Γ-one-
common profiles. In proposition 7, I show that any Γ-one-common profile induces an infinite dominance threshold in Γ.
Informally, given a simultaneous N-struck procedure Γ, a profile is a
Γ-one-common profile if in one of the final subgames of Γ, the set of jurors who
remain unchallenged gives rise to the free-rider problem described above. Formally, given Γ, a profile is a Γ-one-common profile if there exists a subgame γ
of Γ such that (a) both parties can still challenge jurors in γ (that is,  gi ³ 1 for
both i ∈ {D, P}), (b) the first round of γ is the final round of γ in which both parties can challenge jurors,23 and (c) among the unchallenged jurors, one of the  gD
worst jurors according to RD is also one of the  gP worst jurors according to RP.
Example 5, Part 1. Consider the alternatingM procedure and any problem in
which cD = cP = 2, b = 1, and the preferences for jurors are as displayed as follows:

The profile is not a one-common profile because {4, 5} ∩ {1, 3} = ∅. However,
consider the subgame γ* that follows from D challenging juror 4 and P challenging juror 5 in the first round. Subgame γ* satisfies conditions a and b in the definition of an alternatingM-one-common profile. In addition, both players have the
same worst juror among {1, 2, 3}, the set of unchallenged jurors at the beginning of γ*. Hence, condition c is also satisfied, and so this is an alternatingM-one-
common profile. Consider one-shotM-one-common profiles. The only subgame
of the one-shotM procedure is the one-shotM procedure itself. Hence, in the case
of the one-shotM procedure, conditions a, b, and c boil down to requiring that
among N, one of the cD worst jurors according to RD is also one of the cP worst
jurors according to RP, which is the definition of a one-common profile. Because
the sets of one-shotM-one-common and one-common profiles are identical, proposition 7 generalizes proposition 5.
Proposition 7. For any simultaneous N-struck procedure Γ, if the profile is a
Γ-one-common profile, then the dominance threshold of Γ is ∞.
Example 5, Part 2. To see why the dominance threshold is infinite in subgame γ*, observe that in γ*, each party wants to free ride on her opponent’s challenge of juror 3. This induces an infinite dominance threshold for the same reasons that the dominance threshold is infinite in example 4.
Propositions 6 and 7 jointly imply that, whenever the profile is an alternatingM-
23
This could arise because the first round of γ is the terminal round of Γ or because both parties
have only one challenge left in γ.
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one-common profile (and preferences on outcomes are strict), the dominance
threshold of the alternatingQ procedure is smaller than the dominance threshold
of the alternatingM procedure. That is, proposition 3 partially extends to alternating procedures. In the Online Appendix, I show that the alternatingM-onecommon profiles are a strict superset of the one-common profiles. Hence, the
arguments about the prevalence of one-common profiles in Section 5.2 extend to
alternatingM-one-common profiles.
7. Extension: Incomplete Information
Because the lowest dominance threshold for reasonable challenge procedures
is 2 (proposition 1), the above comparisons implicitly assume that the parties
know each other’s preferences. As these comparisons show, once preferences are
known, some procedures lead to simpler strategic interplays than others.
It is conceivable for the parties to know each other’s preferences, especially if
their attorneys repeatedly interact with one another. Typically, the parties also
share information about the jurors (for example, both parties witness the jurors’
answers to all parties’ questions), which may help them in forming accurate models of each other’s preferences. However, in a number of cases, a party may have
only incomplete information about her opponent’s preferences. In such cases,
dominance thresholds larger than 1 provide little information about the strategic
complexity of a mechanism, and the above comparisons are less meaningful.
To deal with incomplete information, one must first model the parties’ strategic choices when information about preferences is incomplete but fixed. By
“fixed,” I mean a situation in which parties do not update their beliefs about the
other party’s preferences on the basis of the history of the game. In a second step,
it may be important to consider the possibility of such updates. In this section, I
provide some tools and formal results related to the first step and discuss the second step more succinctly and informally.
A natural extension of the dominance threshold to situations of incomplete information consists in assuming that the parties have set beliefs about one another’s preferences rather than (accurate) point beliefs. That is, instead of knowing
−i’s preference, party i knows only that −i’s preference belongs to some subset
-i i Í -i containing −i’s true preference (that is, R-i Î -i i ). When updating of
beliefs is not considered, these sets remain unchanged throughout the game.
Subset -i i represents i’s first-order beliefs about −i’s preferences. A general
extension of the dominance threshold would require a complete specification of
higher-order beliefs as well.24 To avoid such intricacies, it is useful to assume that
24
For example, identifying the set of i’s level-2 models of −i requires knowing how i believes −i
would play a best response if −i assumes that i has a level-1 strategy. To do so in general, it is not
enough to specify i’s first-order beliefs -i i about −i’s preferences. One also needs to determine i’s
second-order beliefs about −i’s first-order beliefs, say i-i ,i . Party i then expects −i to model i’s
level-1 behavior on the basis of some preference in i-i ,i . Party i can therefore form a level-2 model
of −i playing a best response according to some preference in -i i to a level-1 model of i that is based
on some preference in i-i ,i .
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beliefs are consistent and common knowledge. That is, although each party does
not know her opponent’s preferences, she knows her opponent’s best guess about
her own preferences. Each also knows that her opponent knows her guess about
her opponent’s preferences, and so on. Formally, party i believes that −i’s preference is some R-i i Î -i i , and −i knows that i believes her preference is R-i i . In
turn, i knows that −i knows that i believes her preference is R-i i , and so on.
Although simple, this incomplete-information setting departs in a nontrivial
way from the complete-information situation studied in the previous sections. In
particular, the parties’ beliefs (RDP , RPD ) Î DP ´ PD can differ from P and D’s true
preferences RD and RP. Complete information is of course a special case of this
P
more general model obtained by setting PD = {RP } and D = {RD }.
If beliefs are consistent and common knowledge, the iterated elimination
of never-best responses unfolds similarly as with complete information but
based on some (RDP , RPD ) Î DP ´ PD possibly different from (RD, RP). One can
then conveniently generalize the dominance threshold to make it a function of
first-order beliefs only. Leave level-0 strategies unchanged. For any procedure
Γ, any first-order beliefs (DP , PD ), any i ∈ {D, P}, and any k Î  \ {0}, the set
of i’s (DP , PD ) level-k strategies is defined as the union of i’s level-k strategies
P
D
P
D
in all games (G, RDP , RPD ) for which (RD , RP ) Î D ´ P . Observe that the set of
P
D
(D , P ) level-k strategies of i then corresponds to −i’s model of i’s level-k strategies. This set contains—but need not be identical to—the set of i’s actual best responses to −i’s (DP , PD ) level-(k − 1) strategies (where “actual” means according
to i’s true preference Ri Î i-i ).
The (DP , PD ) dominance threshold of a procedure Γ is the smallest integer r*
such that both players have a strategy that is a best response (according to their
true preferences) to every (DP , PD ) level-(r* − 1) strategy of their opponent.
(Again, the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold is ∞ if there is no such r*.) When the
threshold is finite, the profile of these best responses is again a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of game (Γ, RD, RP) because the true profile (RD, RP) is included in
DP ´ PD .25 For the same reason, the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold of a procedure is always no smaller than the procedure’s (complete-information) dominance threshold.
Example 6. Consider the incomplete-information situation discussed after
proposition 4 and based on example 3, which features b = cD = cP = 1. Suppose that the true preferences are again aligned with 1 RD 2 RD 3 and 1 RP 2 RP 3
and that D is the first party to challenge in the one-shotQ procedure. However,
unlike under complete information, D’s beliefs about P’s preference PD contain
both RP and RP with 2 RP 1 RP 3 (that is, D knows only that juror 3 is P’s least-
preferred juror). Party P’s beliefs DP can be any subset of D . As in the complete-
information case, P has a unique best response to any strategy of D, whereas D’s
25
However, the same strategy profile does not need to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
P
D
game (G, RD¢ , RP¢ ) when (RD , RP ) ¹ (RD¢ , RP¢ ) because in the definition of the (D , P ) dominance
threshold, the parties’ best responses to all (DP , PD ) level-(r* − 1) strategies of their opponent are in
terms of their true preferences (RD, RP), and not in terms of (RD¢ , RP¢ ).
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best response depends on P’s strategy. If D assumes that P has a level-1 strategy,
then D anticipates that P will play either of two strategies depending on whether
P’s preference is RP or RP . Yet challenging juror 2 is a best response for D to
both of these level-1 strategies of P.26 As a consequence, the (DP , PD ) dominance
threshold of the one-shotQ procedure is 2. Observe that challenging juror 2 is the
only such strategy for D. Because PD contains preference 2 RP 1 RP 3, D considers
the possibility that if she acted as if she had a level-1 strategy, P would challenge
juror 1 following her challenge of juror 3 (in which case, she would have been
better off challenging juror 2, to which P would have responded by challenging
juror 3 herself). In contrast, in the complete-information case, both challenging
juror 2 and challenging juror 3 are best responses to L1P strategies for D.
For beliefs different from those presented in example 6 (for example, if preference 3 Rˆ P 2 Rˆ P 1 is added to PD ; see also example 7), the one-shotQ procedure can have a larger, even infinite (DP , PD ) dominance threshold. This
is in spite of the fact that every individual game (one-shotQ, (RDP , RPD )) with
(RDP , RPD ) Î DP ´ PD itself has a dominance threshold of 2 (with respect to preferences (RDP , RPD )), which shows that the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold is a nontrivial generalization of the dominance threshold PD ). Proposition 5 however
generalizes in the sense that the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold of the one-shotQ
procedure is always no larger (and sometimes smaller) than that of the one-shotM
procedure.
Proposition 8. (i) For every problem and every belief structure (DP , PD ), the
(DP , PD ) dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is no smaller than the
(DP , PD ) dominance threshold of the one-shotQ procedure. (ii) For some problems and some belief structures, the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold of the oneshotM procedure is larger than the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold of the oneshotQ procedure.
To what extent the comparison of multiple-rounds procedures in Section 6 also
generalizes to incomplete information using the (DP , PD ) dominance threshold
is an open question.
As a transition toward a discussion of updating beliefs, it is interesting to
consider the new asymmetry that emerges in the one-shotQ procedure once incomplete information is taken into account. The one-shotQ procedure is obviously asymmetric with or without incomplete information because it makes one
party challenge before the other. Interestingly, although this asymmetry may be
viewed as procedurally unfair compared with the symmetric one-shotM procedure, judges and state legislators seem to leverage such asymmetries rather than
try to alleviate them. In particular, instead of randomizing the order in which the
parties challenge in sequential procedures, rules of legal procedures often select a
deterministic first mover.27 Judges and state legislators seem to try to take advanObserve that this would remain true if 1 Rˆ P 3 Rˆ P 2 was further added to D’s belief set PD .
For example, New Jersey has the following order: “[T]he State in a criminal case and the plaintiff in a civil case exercis[e] the first challenge” (N.J. R. 1:8-3[e][1]).
26
27
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tage of a procedure’s asymmetries to favor a certain party by giving it the role in
the procedure they perceive to be most favorable.
Under complete information, there is a known advantage to being the first to
challenge in the alternatingQ procedure, provided that preferences satisfy a mild
regularity condition defined in DeGroot and Kadane (1980). The same is true in
general in the one-shotQ procedure. Intuitively, the party who moves first can
take advantage of her accurate prediction of her opponent’s behavior in the second stage to let her opponent challenge jurors in her place and use some of her
challenges optimally on other jurors.
Proposition 9. (i) For every problem, any party weakly prefers the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the one-shotQ procedure in which she challenges
first to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the one-shotQ procedure in which she
challenges second. (ii) There exist problems for which this preference is strict.
This is not necessarily the case, however, under incomplete information, which
introduces a counterbalancing asymmetry between the parties. If the party who
moves first plays a best response to a level-1 model of her opponent that is based
on the wrong preference, she might have been better off challenging second instead, knowing the set of jurors that the other party first challenged.
Example 7. Consider again the case b = cD = cP = 1 and suppose that D has
preference 1 RD 2 RD 3 and that P has preference set 3 RP 2 RP 1. Whereas P knows
D’s preferences and DP = {RD }, party D is unsure of P’s preferences, and PD contains both RP and RP defined by 2 RP 1 RP 3. In this case, there is no strategy for
D that is a best response to both level-1 models of P based on RP and RP . If D
challenges first in the one-shotQ procedure and decides to play a best response
to a level-1 model of P based on RP , D challenges juror 2 hoping that P will then
challenge juror 3. But because P’s true preference is RP, following P’s challenge of
juror 2, P in fact challenges juror 1, which leaves juror 3 as the effective juror. If
instead juror P had challenged first in the one-shotQ procedure, she would have
challenged juror 1 knowing that D would then challenge juror 3. This would have
resulted in juror 2 becoming the effective juror, an outcome that D prefers to the
outcome of the one-shotQ procedure in which she challenges first on the basis of
an erroneous guess about P’s preference.
Observe how the possible advantage of moving second in the one-shotQ procedure relates to the asymmetry in strategic complexity between the parties. The
one-shotQ procedure is strategically more complex for the first party to challenge
than for the second. If information is complete enough to predict the behavior
of the second party to challenge sufficiently accurately (as in example 6), the first
party can take advantage of this strategic complexity to secure a better jury. If
information is too incomplete and predictions of the second party’s behavior are
too fuzzy (as in example 7), the first party might prefer the strategically simpler
position of being the second to challenge.
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As example 7 illustrates, the usefulness of moving second materializes even in
the absence of updating beliefs in the one-shotQ procedure. In a sense, after the
second party observes the first party’s behavior, it is irrelevant whether the second
party updates her beliefs about the first party’s preferences. In multiple-rounds
procedures, the disadvantage of moving first can be further reinforced if the parties effectively use past actions to update their beliefs about one another’s preferences.28
Consider, for example, the sequential variant of the two-shots procedure described in note 9. In this procedure, the second party to challenge has the opportunity to update her beliefs about the first party’s preferences using the first
party’s action in the first round. This, in turn, allows the second party to better
anticipate the first party’s action in the second round. This imbalance is somewhat compensated by the fact that the first party then also learns from the second
party’s action in the first round before choosing her action in the second round.
But in sequential procedures in which the order of challenges never changes, the
second mover always has one more opportunity to learn from the first mover’s
action and react to it.29
Informally, it seems that introducing updating beliefs could have two counterbalancing effects on the comparison of sequential and simultaneous procedures.
On the one hand, having more accurate beliefs about an opponent’s preferences
makes a game simpler. This could favor sequential procedures because they
give more opportunities for the parties to observe each other’s actions and update their beliefs. On the other hand, the parties would then have to worry about
the information they reveal through their actions, which can make a game more
complex. This could favor simultaneous procedures if simultaneity means that
the parties less often have to worry about the information their actions reveal.
How these two effects play out (if at all) and whether moving first really harms
the first party by giving her fewer opportunities to react to updated beliefs are
open questions that would require a full-fledged model of the parties’ updating
process. Such a model is beyond the scope of the present paper, but better understanding incomplete information and updating of beliefs in selection procedures
(beyond propositions 8 and 9) are interesting directions for future research.
8. Conclusion
This paper shows how jury selection procedures can be compared in terms of
their strategic complexity by computing their dominance thresholds, that is, the
required number of rounds to eliminate strategies that are never-best responses
28
It may be in this sense that judges view blind procedures as less prone to strategizing than alternating ones.
29
Recall that asymmetries such as this one can be useful if officials find it desirable to favor one
party over the other. If, however, symmetry is viewed as desirable, it may be beneficial to alternate
the order of challenges (with one party challenging first, the second party challenging twice, followed by the first party challenging twice again, and so on), as has been proposed, for example, to
make penalty shootouts fairer (Brams and Ismail 2018).
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Figure 3. Arbitrary hierarchical model for a given preference profile

for the parties to have a dominant strategy. The dominance threshold offers a
new method to compare the strategic complexity of mechanisms. Unlike previous methods in the literature (Pathak and Sönmez 2013; de Clippel, Eliaz, and
Knight 2014; Arribillaga and Massó 2016), it allows for comparisons even when
the mechanisms at stake are indirect or induce games of imperfect information.
More generally, the dominance threshold shows how hierarchical models can be used to compare the strategic complexity of mechanisms. As shown
in Figure 3, for any profile (RD, RP), a hierarchical model specifies a pair
({SD0 , . . . , SDm }, {SP0 , . . . , SPm }) of collections of nested strategy sets; that is,
i Í Si0 Í  Í Sim (m could be infinite). As k increases, the sets Sik represent increasingly restrictive models of the strategies that i could potentially play.
This paper examines the level-k hierarchical model ({L0D , . . . , LmD }, {L0P , . . . , LmP })
m
0
m
D , . . . , LD }, {LP , . . . , LP }) defined in Section 4. Given a profile (RD, RP), I define the dominance threshold as the smallest hierarchical level r* for which each party i has
a strategy si* Î i that is a best response to every strategy in Lr-*i-1 . I then use the
dominance threshold as a measure of strategy complexity.
Clearly, this logic is not specific to the level-k hierarchical model. A natural
alternative would be to use the undominated hierarchical model UD defined by
the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. One could then define
an alternative UD dominance threshold. In general, there is no logical relation
between the UD dominance threshold and the level-k dominance threshold of a
game. However, some of the results in this paper also apply when the UD dominance threshold is used instead.
First, it is not hard to see that the UD dominance threshold of the one-shotQ
procedure is 2. Second, it can be shown that for every problem, the UD dominance threshold of the one-shotM procedure is at least as large as the level-k dom-

This content downloaded from 129.123.124.107 on June 24, 2019 12:19:40 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Jury Selection Procedures

737

inance threshold of the one-shotM procedure.30 Hence, the results in Section 5.2
also apply using the UD dominance threshold. In particular, the UD dominance
threshold of the one-shotM procedure is larger than 2 for a significant set of problems. Whether the results of Section 6 also extend to the case of a UD dominance
threshold is left as an open question.
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